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A B S T R A C T
This paper focuses on the educational opportunities available to rural migrant children in Beijing. On the
basis of fieldwork conducted in migrant communities in 2004–2005, I conclude that administrative and
financial barriers, as well as discrimination, prevent migrant children from entering state schools. I
discuss the quality of education available in unlicensed private schools, followed by an analysis of the
possible reasons for the state’s exclusion of migrant children from state schools and its hostility to
migrants’ self-provision of education.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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This paper focuses on the education of rural migrant children in
Beijing, and what can be learnt from it about Chinese government
policy towardsmigration and educationmore generally. It is based
on 5 months of fieldwork carried out in Beijing from November
2004 to April 2005. My aim in undertaking this fieldwork was to
discover what educational opportunities were available to the
children of rural migrant labourers in the capital and to investigate
some of the causes of this situation. I also aimed to discover how
migrant families had responded to their situation, and how the
state had helped or hindered them in their attempts to provide
education for their children.
In this paper, I will first explain the contemporary rural migrant
situation in China and its historical background. In Section 2, I will
describe the fieldwork I conducted, and set outmy findings, as well
as providing a brief update on the situation in the run up to the
Beijing Olympic Games. In Section 3, I will discuss the results of
this work, examining the state’s failure to provide education for
migrant children, analysing the mechanisms through which
migrant children were excluded from the state school system
and suggesting why the state might have wished to deny access to
these children. I will then look at the state’s responses to the
migrants’ own provision of education and compare this with the
situation in other developing countries, suggesting some reasons
why China might be considered an unusual case in its apparent
wish to deny education to migrant children.* Correspondence address: St. Catharine’s College, Cambridge CB1 2QG.
E-mail address: ceg29@cam.ac.uk.
0738-0593/$ – see front matter  2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2009.04.0051.1. Migration in China and the hukou system
According to Chinese government statistics, in 2003 there were
approximately 125 million rural-to-urban migrants in China,
accounting for 23.2% of total rural labour and nearly 10% of the
total population of China (National Bureau of Statistics of China,
2004). Most of thesemigrants came, and still come, frompoor rural
areas in interior provinces and the west of China, moving towards
the eastern and coastal regions, where economic development is
more advanced.
The current situation of rural migrants has arisen as a direct
result of long-term constraints on population mobility in China.
During the 1950s, in an attempt to control population movement,
the Chinese government classified every Chinese citizen as either
‘‘rural’’ or ‘‘urban’’ through a system of household registration
(hukou). The effect of this hukou system was to create a ‘caste-like
system of social stratification’ between urbanites and rural
peasants (Potter and Potter, 1990). One’s classification as rural
or urban determined not only one’s place of residence, but also the
benefits one could receive from the state. Urban dwellers had
access to state-subsidised benefits such as food, life employment,
medical insurance, housing, social security and pensions (Solinger,
1999). Those who were designated rural dwellers were entitled to
none of these. Hukou status was passed through the maternal line,
such that newborn babies would be registered in the area of their
mothers’ permanent address. The hukou system was maintained
by two methods. ‘‘Neighbourhood committees’’ (jumin weiyuan-
hui) reported newcomers to the authorities, while a strict rationing
system provided basic goods only to those with an urban hukou.
Any peasant who attempted to move to the city would thus be
caught by the authorities or would be unable to obtain food. The
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migration.
1.2. The hukou system since the 1980s
After the mid-1980s, however, large-scale rural-to-urban
migration again became possible. A relaxation in the implementa-
tion of hukou laws and the re-commodification of many basic
goods meant that the rapidly growing urban private sector was
able to absorb large numbers of low-paid labourers from the
countryside. An unprecedented wave of large-scale migration (da
qiyi) had begun. Increased agricultural productivity caused by the
introduction of the household responsibility system in the late
1970s, and a decrease in per capita cultivated land, created a
surplus of millions of peasants—by 1984 there were already an
estimated 95 million surplus rural workers (Li, 1996). More recent
estimates suggest that therewill be a pool ofmore than 500million
surplus rural labourers before the year 2010 (Ministry of
Agriculture, 2004). While some of the surplus workers were able
to find employment in the rural industries which sprang up after
the end of the commune system in the early 1980s, millionsmoved
to cities and towns. The large income gap between cities and
countryside, and the increasing availability of work in the
construction, manufacturing and service sectors in China’s urban
areas, combined to encourage surplus rural workers to migrate to
seek their fortunes (Rozelle et al., 1999).
Migrants are no longer prevented from entering urban areas,
and the system of ‘‘custody and repatriation’’, which was used
extensively in the 1980s and 1990s to transfer rural migrants back
to the countryside, ceased to be used after 2003, when the beating
to death of a university student in custody provoked national
outrage. However, at the time of my fieldwork in 2004–2005 the
vast majority of migrants were still unable to convert their rural
hukou to an urban one and thus had no access to the goods and
services restricted to urban hukou-holders, which in many cities
included state education, healthcare and housing.1 Although there
have been reforms to the hukou system, especially in smaller cities
and towns, the system was still legally in force at the time of
writing (October 2008), and is particularly stringently enforced in
the capital, Beijing. Any transfer of hukou status from agricultural
to non-agricultural remains extremely difficult and must go
through official channels. Recruitment by an urban enterprise
(zhao gong), enrolment in an urban university (zhao sheng) or
promotion to a senior administrative post (zhao gan) are the most
common reasons for a transfer to be accepted. However, even
within these state-authorised transfers, there can still be
difficulties—for example, whether or not the recruiting enterprise
is owned by the state might be a major factor for acceptance or
rejection of the transfer application.
Although the movement of people is no longer tightly
regulated, transfer of hukou status is still subject to strict policy
and quota controls. The urban–rural hierarchy is thus replicated
within the cities themselves, creating what Kam Wing Chan has
called a ‘two-class urban society’ (Chan, 1999). Although it seems
that, despite their status as second-class citizens in the cities, most
adult migrants may benefit from migration, at least in terms of
increased income, there has been far less work on the effects of
migration on children who move with their parents. The social
divisions faced by migrants are of particular significance for these
children. This is not only a problem of legal hukou status and rights
to membership in urban society; as I will explain in Sections 2 and
3, the perceived as well as administrative dichotomy between1 Some Chinese cities, including Shanghai, have made it possible for a limited
number of wealthy migrants, usually from smaller cities, to purchase household
registrations. Beijing, however, still retains the old-fashioned hukou system.peasants and urbanites is fundamental to shaping the lives, and
particularly the educational experiences, of migrant children in
urban areas.
1.3. Migrant children
Official statistics show that there were 25 million migrant
children in Chinese cities in the year 2000; unofficial estimates are
far higher (UNESCO, 2000). Most of these have come to join parents
already working in urban areas. These children are unable, in a
majority of cities, to attend state schools without paying several
kinds of extra fees not paid by local children. In addition, non-
financial barriers, such as the demand for up to nine separate
official documents, strict quotas and a supposed shortage of school
places act to exclude migrants from city schools. Migrant parents
cannot afford to send their children to licensed private schools,
most of which charge much higher fees than state schools. A
majority of school-age migrant children therefore attend ‘‘black’’
unlicensed migrant-run schools instead, often in very poor
conditions.
Despite the fact that local governments were required by law
to provide 9 years of education, until 1996 migrant children were
refused permission to enrol in city state schools. New regulations
passed that year allowed thosewithout an urban hukou to enrol in
state schools in certain areas on an experimental basis if they
could provide the necessary documents, yet it is unclear how
widely this standardwas adopted. In 1998, a notice of ‘‘Provisional
Measures for the EducationofMigrant Children’’was issued by the
Ministry of Education, encouraging cities to provide education for
migrants, but has remained a policy ‘‘guideline’’ rather than
becoming legally binding. In 2003, the State Council circulated a
further official notice urging local governments to provide state
school education for all children under their jurisdictions (SCPRC,
2003). However, while in some cities the authorities attempted to
limit certain of the extra fees charged to migrant families by state
schools, in many cases the State Council’s notice may have led to
the closure of unlicensed private schools for migrants (on the
grounds that the notice specifies children should receive state
education) without any actual provision for placing the students
in state schools.
It is difficult to gather accurate information about unlicensed
private schools in China, and the situation differs widely from
city to city. In Chengdu, a 2003 study showed that even the two
schools for migrant children which met the criteria for the
government licensing of private schools were rejected in their
licence applications (Froissart, 2003). While one of the two
schools was eventually granted a year’s licence, it was first forced
to demolish new canteen and dormitory facilities in order to
provide extra room for classrooms, and was then unable to renew
its licence because of the lack of canteen and dormitory facilities.
At the time of the report, both schools were threatened with
closure, as were a further nine unlicensed schools in the city
(Froissart, 2003). By contrast, in the Special Economic Zone of
Xiamen, where roughly half of the city’s population are migrants,
the municipal government published legislation in 2002 allow-
ing the regularisation of 34 unlicensed migrant schools, and
creating a special office responsible for their direction (Nanfang
Zhoumo, 2003). In Shanghai, authorities have focused on closing
unlicensed migrant schools in the city’s central area, and reports
suggest that between 10% and 40% of the children have been
absorbed into the state school system (French, 2007). Migrant
schools on the periphery of the city have apparently remained
largely unaffected. Other cities such as Hangzhou have report-
edly given technical assistance to migrant schools in an attempt
to bring them up to the standards of licensed private schools in
the city (Taipei Times, 2007).
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migrant children. Official figures put the number of migrant
children in Beijing in 2003 at 240 000 (China Daily, 2004). The
Nanfang Zhoumo newspaper, known for its investigative journal-
ism, found that by the end of 2000, 87.5% of migrant children in
Beijingwere not enrolled in state schools (Nanfang Zhoumo, 2000).
Although the Beijing Municipal Government has decreed that
migrant children ‘‘fulfilling the conditions for attending schools on
a temporary basis’’ will be able to enrol in state schools in the
neighbourhoods where they reside, provided that they obtain an
‘‘approval permit for temporary schooling’’ (jiedu pizhun shu), in
practice it seems that the vast majority of migrant children in the
capital are still excluded from state schooling through a variety of
official and unofficial mechanisms. Furthermore, despite this
exclusion from state schooling, both at the time of fieldwork and
since, the Beijing authorities havemaintained a firm stance against
unlicensed migrant schools, closing down at least four during my
fieldwork period and, according to reports, more than 50 since
(Human Rights Watch, 2006).
In many developing countries the state is willing to support, or
at least to tolerate, non-state organisations providing education for
migrants or other marginalised groups. For example, in India a
large number of not-for-profit non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) work to provide education for children from low-income
families, both through the running of ‘‘drop-in’’ schools in slum
areas, providing low-cost informal education for children unable to
attend state schools, and through the teaching of free supple-
mentary classes for migrants and other disadvantaged children
within the state system. These supplementary ‘‘bridge classes’’ and
remedial education sessions, which aim to improve basic
numeracy and literacy, take place after school hours inside state
schools, with children identified by state teachers, and the NGOs
receive financial support from the central government as well as
from other donors.2 Another NGO, which assists state child
development programmes in India, specifically targets the children
of rural migrants by establishing cre`ches and schools on
construction sites, where the majority of new migrant workers
are employed in manual labour.3 Furthermore, a wide network of
for-profit ‘‘private schools for the poor’’ provide educational
opportunities for those excluded from or dissatisfiedwith the state
education system at a price which is affordable even to many low-
income families (Tooley and Dixon, 2005). In Bangladesh, where
basic health and education are under-provided by the state, non-
profit groups provide childcare centres and schools in many
factories and workplaces with a high concentration of migrants
and other badly-paid workers, whose children would not
otherwise attend school (Khan, 2005). In contrast with these
countries, China is an unusual case, since the state not only
reinforces the exclusion of migrant children from the state
education system, but actively prevents societal groups from
organising their own education for these children. I will return to
the question of why China is exceptional in this regard after setting
out my fieldwork findings.
2. Fieldwork
From November 2004 to April 2005 I conducted research in
three migrant communities in Beijing city. Two of the commu-
nities were in Haidian district, in the north-west of Beijing, and
one was in Fengtai, in the south-west. Both districts have heavy
concentrations of migrant workers, many of whom have been
resident for at least 3 years andwhohave brought their children to
the city.2 NGOs Doorstep Schools and Pratham undertake these types of project.
3 This is the work of NGO Mobile Cre`ches.2.1. Methodology
I taught English classes in two unlicensed migrant primary
schools (in Haidian) and a migrant middle school (in Fengtai) for 4
months. I also observed other classes at these schools and
interviewed their teachers and head teachers. After school, I was
introduced by the teachers to themigrant parents whose children I
was teaching, and I conducted semi-structured interviews with 25
mothers and 7 fathers. In these interviews I focused on their
reasons formigration, the education of their children in their home
villages, the reasons for bringing their children to Beijing and their
experiences of trying to have their children educated in the capital.
I also informally interviewed the children aged between 8 and 15
who attended my classes, asking them about their memories of
their schools in home villages, their feelings about Beijing schools
and about their lives in Beijing more generally. I visited a further
eight migrant schools and six state schools across Beijing for
observation of lessons and activities, and I conducted interviews
with teachers and staff.
In the next three sections, I shall describe what I found to be the
three main barriers to the enrolment of migrant children in state
schools, before moving on to consider migrants’ responses to the
exclusion of their children from state education in Sections 2.5, 2.6
and 2.7.
2.2. Administrative barriers to education
From interviews with state school staff, I learned that migrant
parents who did not have at least the required identification card,
temporary residency permit and work permit, or whose children
had been born ‘‘out of plan’’ (unauthorised by state population
planning policies), were unable to enrol their children in any
state school. All the state schools I visited emphasised the need
for the correct documents. Two of the six state schools I visited
required a total of eight documents from the parents before a
migrant child could be enrolled: identification card, temporary
residence permit, employment permit, health certificate of the
parent, population planning certificate, social insurance certifi-
cate, guardianship certificate or birth certificate and health
certificate of the child. None of the migrant parents I interviewed
had all of these documents, and only 2 of the 32 had both
temporary residence permit and work permit. Given the large
proportion of migrants who did not have these documents, many
children were thus excluded from education even before the
affordability of education is considered (which I shall discuss in
Section 2.3).
Although new provisions were put in place in Beijing in July
2004 which forbade state schools from charging ‘‘donation fees’’
(zanzhu fei) to registered migrants, in effect the new provisions
still barred the most disadvantaged migrant children from city
schools on administrative grounds. The requirement that
migrant parents obtain an ‘‘approval permit for temporary
schooling’’ in order to gain exemption from the ‘‘donation fees’’
prevented most migrant parents from enrolling their children in
Beijing schools. In order to obtain this permit, parents needed to
present a temporary residence permit and a migrant work
permit in addition to both parents’ hukou, identity cards and
population planning certificate. None of the 32 migrant parents I
interviewed had all of these documents. Furthermore, the 2004
provisions stated that ‘‘other official documents’’ could be
requested—giving officials a de facto discretionary power to turn
down applications. Of the 17 parents I interviewed who had
approached local state schools in an attempt to enrol their
children, 13 mentioned lacking the correct documents as the
main reason for being turned away. One father of a 9-year-old
boy explained:
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my son. I don’t have a temporary residence certificate.
Temporary residence certificates are really hard to acquire –
first you need a work permit, and they are expensive too. Who
has the money? If I buy the permits, I can’t buy food for my
son. . .Without a temporary residence certificate, in Beijing, I am
nothing’’.
2.3. Financial barriers to education
In addition to these administrative barriers to education,
prohibitively high fees prevented many migrant children from
attending state school. All but two of the migrant parents I
interviewed mentioned fees as a primary factor in their choice of
unlicensed migrant schools. Before enrolling in a government
school in 2004, any child without a residence permit in Beijing was
required to pay two official government sets of fees, an ‘‘education
compensation fee’’ (jiaoyu buchang fei) of 1000 RMB a semester and
a ‘‘temporary schooling fee’’ (jiedu fei) of 680 RMB a semester.
These were in addition to up to 15 other fees, levied by the
individual school. Teachers in two of the six state schools I visited
told me that migrant parents would be asked to pay all these fees
before the child could begin school. New provisions in Beijing from
July 2004 forbade state schools from charging ‘‘donation fees’’ to
registered migrants, but in three state schools teachers referred to
these fees as though they were still being charged. Whether this
was amisunderstanding on the part of the teachers, or whether the
schools continued to charge donation fees despite the new
regulations, was unclear.
The total fees varied widely in the schools, and ranged from
1200 to more than 8000 RMB per term for primary school
education, with junior and senior middle school levels costing
more again. Most of Beijing’s migrants are engaged in low-paid
jobs, and themigrants I interviewed earned between 700 and 1200
RMB per month. It is not surprising that only 12.5% of migrant
children in Beijing could afford to attend state schools in 2002 (Li
et al., 2006). Even during the stage of so-called compulsory
education from 6 to 15 years, I found that migrant children had to
pay five or six times the fees charged to local students. Although
many of the fees were unofficial, the central state did not seem to
prevent schools from charging miscellaneous uncapped amounts
in addition to the two sets of state-levied fees. One teacher in a
‘‘black’’ migrant school told me that ‘‘in practice there is no
restriction on the fees [charged by the state schools]. In our whole
[migrant] district there is not even one person who can afford to
pay these fees.’’
2.4. Discrimination in state schools as a barrier to education
Discrimination in state schools is a third barrier to the state
education of migrant children. Migrant communities in Beijing are
seen predominantly as sources of crime and disorder, and the
children of migrants are not free of these associations. Pun Ngai’s
work onmigrants in Shenzhen clearly demonstrates urban opinion
of migrants’ behaviour as ‘‘peasant-like’’, ‘‘dirty’’, ‘‘untrustworthy’’
and ‘‘ignorant’’ (Pun, 1999). Similarly, in Beijing, migrants are
believed to be responsible for the majority of street crimes (Beijing
Wanbao, 2004b). ‘‘Uncivilised’’ behaviour such as cooking outside,
burning rubbish in the street and washing at outdoor taps are all
also seen as characteristic of backward rural life and low ‘‘quality’’
(Beijing Wanbao, 2004a). The children of migrant workers were
commonly perceived by Beijingers I spoke to as being ‘‘out of
control’’, ‘‘not disciplined’’, ‘‘dirty’’ and ‘‘ignorant’’. Those migrant
children attending Beijing state schools face discrimination from
classmates, teachers and parents of local students. A state school
teacher I interviewed confessed that many parents do not wanttheir children to sit in the same class as migrant children. Some of
the state school teachers also seemed to share these attitudes.
The accents, style of dress and different behaviour of many
migrant children means that they are easily identifiable as
different, and many of the migrant children I interviewed spoke
of being disliked by Beijing locals. Only two children said that they
had friendswhowere fromBeijing. One 8-year-old girl toldme that
Beijing children ‘‘don’t like us becausewe are ‘outside’ people’’. Her
12-year-old brother confirmed: ‘‘sometimes they throw stones. . .
some children call us dogs. They say we are dirty and they laugh at
our clothes.’’ These stories were confirmed on a trip I made to a
local park with 30 children from one migrant school, where native
Beijingers prevented their children from joining games and
English-learning activities with the migrant children. Several
parents made audible comments about the children’s behaviour
andmanners, and onemother forcibly dragged her son away. I was
warned by a Beijing woman not to associate with such children
because they ‘‘are dirty, their quality is low and they steal’’.
The state education system reinforces discrimination against
migrant children within state schools. State school teachers
confirmed that in most schools students without a local hukou
had no right to be selected as ‘‘thrice good’’ (san hao) honours
students and had no scholarship opportunities. Their school files
and grades were often not officially recorded. In effect, the small
minority of migrant childrenwhowere able to attend state schools
seemed not to be counted as ‘‘normal’’ students at all by the urban
children, the state school teachers or the education system itself.
Eight migrant parents I interviewed cited discrimination from
teachers and local students as a reason for notwishing to send their
children to state schools even if placeswere available or affordable.
Given the negative attitudes towards migrant children, in addition
to administrative and financial obstacles, it is unsurprising that
most migrants send their children to ‘‘black’’ unlicensed, migrant-
run schools rather than Beijing’s state schools.
2.5. Migrant-run schools
Having described the limitations on migrant children’s educa-
tion in Beijing, I will now examine the way migrants have
responded to their situation by establishing their own unlicensed
schools. In this section, I will describe the conditions in the
unlicensed migrant schools I visited in Beijing, and examine in
detail the situations of two such schools. I was told by the head of
one primary school that there were over 250 ‘‘black’’ schools for
migrant children in Beijing. They were all privately owned, usually
by the schools’ principals, and operated for profit. According to
migrant teachers I interviewed, there were only two migrant
middle schools in the city at that time, so that once migrant
children reached the age of 12, many were either sent back to their
villages to continue their education or dropped out of school to stay
in Beijing.
I found that conditions in unlicensed migrant schools were
generally very poor. Although some migrant schools rent space
from government schools and thus have access to the facilities of
those schools (Woronov, 2004), I visited only one such school (the
middle school, which was located in a disused state school
building); the other 10 schools where I taught or observed classes
were based in much less pleasant surroundings. Three schools
were based in former factory buildings in various states of
dilapidation; two were in disused shop buildings; two in very
basic, purpose-built structures; one in coal storage facilities; and
two in the houses of migrant families. Two schools, including the
middle school, had more than 1000 students, while the smallest
school had fewer than 20. Facilities in all the schools were
rudimentary. Although the middle school had comparatively well-
equipped classroomswith electricity and heating, desks and chairs
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rooms for the teachers, but they lacked filing cabinets and the
tables were broken. The primary schools were far worse: four had
no blackboards or chalk. These schools, which were taught,
operated and financed by migrant workers themselves, often with
little or no professional training, were mostly extremely short of
funding.
The history of the Knowledge Middle School, where I taught
English classes fromNovember 2004 to February 2005, provides an
insight into the setting up of a migrant school and the obstacles
encountered. The school, which now operates in the north of
Fengtai District, was established by Principal Li and her husband in
2001.4 Before coming to Beijing, Li had taught in a primary school
in Henan Province, but had left her job, expecting to earn higher
wages working with her husband on a market stall in Beijing. As
the prospects of migrant employment in the cities improved, more
migrant workers brought their children to Beijing. Li was pressed
back into service as a teacher, and began educating children in her
home before starting a school. Eventually she recruited several
other young migrant women from Henan, recent graduates of
technical senior middle schools (zhongzhuan). Enrolment
increased, and by late 2004 the couple had established two more
schools, including a middle school, for more than 3500 students
from all parts of China.
The ethnic and geographical mix of children in Li’s schools was
much more varied than that in most state schools in Beijing, and,
according to my interviews with the teachers, this helped to
prevent discrimination and bullying in the schools, making them
much more welcoming than state schools. I found that many
migrant schools also waived or reduced fees for students whose
parents are too poor to pay. At the Knowledge Middle School, fees
were waived for five types of children: orphans; the disabled;
children of single parents; children born ‘‘out of plan’’; and refugee
children from natural disasters. In 2004 there were about 30 such
children in the school, belonging to seven different ethnic groups.
The fees charged by migrant schools in Beijing in 2004–2005
usually ranged from 400 to 600 RMB a term, and, unlike in state
schools, extra fees were not usually levied for uniforms, trips, extra
tutoring and so on. These factors made sending children to
migrant-run schools a far more affordable option for low-paid
migrant workers than enrolling them in state schools at a cost of
between 1200 and 8000 RMB per term, and required no permits or
certificates from the parents.
Li’s schools were technically illegal, since, like most migrant
schools, they were not registered with local authorities. I was told
that some schools paid a regular fee to the police for them to turn a
blind eye to their operations. Others would regularly shut down
and reopen in a new location to avoid the attention of the
authorities. Still other schools relied on their inconspicuous
appearance and out-of-the-way locations to evade inspection.
Conditions in the Hope Primary School, where I taught and
observed classes between January and April 2005, were typical of
this type of school. The Hope Primary School taught about 140
students in the north part of Beijing’s Haidian District. It was built
by the teachers, parents and students themselves, andwas situated
on a rubbish tipwhichwas still in use by themigrant community. It
had never attempted to register with the authorities since, even
without government hostility tomigrant schools, its facilities were
far from adequate. The school consisted of a smallwalled area, with
four dark classrooms and one slightly larger room for the teachers
to one side. Liang, her husband and twomore teachers lived in this
room, which contained two beds, a small coal fire (where lunch for
the students and teachers was prepared), a table, a dirty cat and4 I have changed the names of teachers and schools for the purpose of anonymity.several boxes of snack food (sold to the students during break
times). The rest of the space was open for children to play.
The school had neither water nor electricity: there were no
lavatories for the children and the classrooms depended on the
open door for light. The classroomswere heated during the coldest
part of the winter with coal bricks, while the door was kept open
for light and to let out the smoke. The children wore padded coats
and hats in class. My year-five class consisted of 23 students aged
from 10 to 15 packed into a dirt-floored room of approximately 4
by 5 m. Many had missed at least 1 year of schooling during the
upheaval of their parents’ migration, and fourmembers ofmy class
had been child labourers in factories before coming to the Hope
School. The children sat on low chairs, some two to a seat. Wooden
benches served as desks, while a small piece of slate was used as a
blackboard. I had to stand outside the doorway in order to observe
when another teacher taught, since the room was so full.
Periodically, the classes were interrupted by gusts of wind, which
swept large amounts of dust and sand in through the open door
and tiny glassless window.5
2.6. Migrant schools’ curriculum
The three migrant schools in which I taught in Beijing tried to
follow the state curriculum as much as possible, and from
observing classes in these and other schools I noticed that many
of the same textbooks were used in the migrant and in the state
schools. However, manymigrant class teachers had an educational
standard only slightly above that of their pupils and little or no
training as teachers. A teacher in the Hope Primary School
admitted that she could not understand the English lessons she
read from the textbook to her class. Neither she nor the students
were able to copy accurately words from the textbook onto the
blackboard. Most schools were unable to offer the full state
curriculum: three of the 10 schools I visited taught only Chinese
and mathematics, since they did not have any staff capable of
teaching other subjects. In all of the primary schools I visited, all
subjects were taught to each class by their class teacher, rather
than having specialist teachers for each subject as in the Beijing
state schools.
In 2004 and 2005 there were many reports in the Beijing
media on how local state schools had implemented recent
educational reforms, moving away from a focus solely on
examinations to a more ‘‘lively’’ curriculum which included
non-examination subjects such as physical education, music, art
and so on (BeijingWanbao, 2005). Themigrant schools lacked the
facilities to offer this type of class, yet the debate about
educational reform had had an impact in at least one of the
primary schools I visited, where the principal had introduced a
‘‘Quality Class’’ consisting mostly of creative activities. Four
primary schools had music classes, yet only one had musical
instruments of any kind (tambourines) and the others relied on
unaccompanied singing or, in one school, playing taped music on
a cassette player. In general, the variety of non-examination
subjects available in the state schools I visited could not be
replicated in the migrant schools, although some head teachers
were aware of the changing curriculum and had attempted to
follow the trend despite limited resources.
2.7. Migrant schools’ physical exercise and health
Again, in stark contrast to the state schools I visited, very little
was done to promote the health or physical fitness of the students
in the Hope School and other migrant schools. In the state5 Similar conditions in another unregistered Beijingmigrant school are described
by Woronov (2004).
6 At the time of writing, it was not clear whether or not this school had in fact
been closed down.
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physical education, and sports and fitness activities, but also with
compulsory health checks, mental health and psychological
counselling, vaccination programmes, exercises and other related
practices. In the twomigrant primary schools in which I taught, no
form of physical activity or exercise was organised, programmes of
inoculation were nonexistent and there were no school-initiated
health assessments. The daily eye exercises, so familiar to students
in Beijing state schools, were unknown in the migrant schools I
visited. Furthermore, it was noticeable that, in each class of 20–30
students, only one or two children wore glasses, compared with a
far higher proportion (at least one-fifth) in Beijing state’s schools.
Nurses and advisors inmost state schools check children’s eyesight
and hearing, as well as height, weight and other factors, at the
beginning of each school year, but there was nothing similar in the
migrant schools.
In all of themigrant primary schools I visited, the age and size of
students in each class varied widely, since many of the children
had missed years of schooling. This meant that competitive sports
would have been extremely difficult to organise. Although the
Knowledge Middle School, which had slightly more age and size
uniformity within classes, did have physical education in the form
of twice-weekly basketball matches, these did not compare with
the routine of morning exercise, daily sports lessons, frequent
sports competitions and military drills I observed in state schools.
Even the children’s playing outside during break times was not
organised: whereas in state schools there were timetabled breaks
where children could play together outside and organise informal
games, in seven of the ten migrant primary schools I visited break
times occurred randomly at ‘‘natural’’ breaks in the lessons. This
meant that not all of the children would be playing outside at one
time, and games were more difficult to organise.
2.8. Closing down migrant schools
It was difficult for the migrant schools I visited to make
improvements to their teaching and facilities, not only because of
their very limited resources but also because of their vulnerability
to closure by the governmentwithoutwarning. Unlicensed schools
could be closed down by local government departments at any
time. Migrant schools in Beijing were thus constantly under threat
of closure, which usually happened with no warning, and with no
attempts to ensure that children’s schooling was not disrupted. I
heard of four such cases during the 5 months of my fieldwork, and,
as far as I could find out, in none of these cases were the children
absorbed into the state system. The shutting down of 50 schools by
the local authorities in Fengtai district in 2001 is a key example of
this kind of school closure, and is especially disturbing since
Fengtai had twice been chosen (in 1996 and 1998) to operate pilot
programmes for national regulations regarding the state schooling
of migrant children (Froissart, 2003). I was told by teachers at the
Knowledge Middle School that these schools had been ordered to
close on health and safety grounds 3 days before the new school
year was to begin. No prior warning had been given to the
proprietors, and one school had apparently even constructed a new
building during the summer vacation. Despite protests by the local
migrant communities the schools were closed and the new
building lost. While I was told in 2004 that many of the 50 schools
had later reopened in different parts of Fengtai (and some had been
re-closed in a further ‘‘clean up’’ in February 2003), this had
nonetheless created serious disruption to the education of several
thousand children.
The uncertainty about the future of schools meant that many
operators were unwilling to invest more to improve the quality of
their school buildings and facilities. Principal Wang of the Bright
Love Primary School told me:‘‘We would like to put windows in the school. We would like to
construct another wall for another classroom. But how can we
do this? If we do these things today, and tomorrow the police
come to close down our school, we will lose everything.’’
Principal Liang at Hope School was reluctant to spend a small
financial donation to the school on structural improvements, since
sheworried that the school would be closed down in the ‘‘clear up’’
of Beijing before the 2008 Olympics, the preparations for which
were already apparent by the end of 2004.6 School principals were
thus left facing a serious contradiction: they were unable to
improve the quality of education and facilities while under
constant threat of closure because of their perceived low quality.
Not only did a lack of state support or investment make it difficult
for migrant schools to provide migrant children with a decent
learning environment of the sort that local children enjoy, but the
state’s efforts to eradicate such schools lowered the quality of
migrant education still further.
The prospects for migrant children in Beijing appear to have
worsened since my fieldwork was carried out. It was widely
rumoured that all migrant workers would be deported from the
capital before the2008OlympicGames, although thiswasdeniedby
the Chinese government and does not appear to have happened on
any large-scale. However, reports indicate that Beijing municipal
authorities closedat least 50migrantschoolsduring2006aspartof a
campaign to close all unregistered schools for migrants before the
OlympicGames. In July2006 theBeijingMunicipality issuedanotice
‘‘on theWork of Strengthening the Safety of Non-ApprovedMigrant
Population Self-Schools’’ setting a deadline of the end of September
for the ‘‘clean up and rectification’’ of all unregistered schools
(Human RightsWatch, 2006). It is not clear whether this happened,
or whether some schools may have re-opened after being closed.
However, it does seem that accessible state education was not
provided for the childrenwho had attended these schools. Although
the revised Compulsory Education Law, which came into effect in
September 2006, specified explicitly that local governments are
responsible for ‘‘creating the conditions for internal migrant
children to receive free, compulsory education’’, it is still the case
that, under Beijing Education Bureau regulations, only registered
migrants with the relevant permits can enrol their children in state
schools. Furthermore, according to a 2007 Amnesty International
report, attempts to prevent state schools from charging extra fees to
migrantshavemetwith little success (Amnesty International, 2007).
3. Why are the educational opportunities of migrant children
restricted?
In the next sections I shall try to explain why the Chinese
state restricts migrant children’s education, discuss the national
authorities’ attempts to improve China’s ‘‘population quality’’,
and analyse the reasons behind migrant children’s exclusion
from these policies. I shall attempt to show that some of the
reasons commonly given by Chinese officials for the exclusion of
migrant children from urban state education are not, in fact,
plausible, and propose some alternative reasons why such
children might be excluded. I shall also discuss the possibly
contradictory aims of local and national governments in China,
and examine the responses of each to private migrant-run
schools, suggesting some reasons why the Chinese case can be
seen as unique, when compared to other developing countries,
in its opposition to the provision of education to migrants by
non-state sectors.
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The concept of ‘‘population quality’’ (renkou suzhi) has played
an important role in Reform-era China. Since the mid-1980s,
China’s modernisation strategies have been framed in terms of
renkou suzhi, and raising ‘‘population quality’’ has been a major
aim of state policy. In 1985, the CCP Central Committee
announced that raising the ‘‘quality’’ of the Chinese people was
‘‘the basic goal of education system reform’’ (Kipnis, 2006). Suzhi,
an everyday word in China, is usually rendered as ‘‘quality’’ but is
not an easy word to translate, as it can be used to refer to
individuals’ physical and psychological characteristics as well as
to their skills, aptitudes, education, ideologies and manners.
Particular ‘‘low quality’’ groups among the Chinese population are
believed by the state to be in need of special attention, and China’s
peasants are usually seen as the lowest of these ‘‘low quality’’
groups (Murphy, 2004). Those peasants who migrate to the cities
are often viewed by local officials as lowering the ‘‘quality’’ of the
city and its services: they are thought to embody China’s
weakness and backwardness. However, they are also expected
to learn and ‘‘improve’’ from their experience, and are encouraged
to take their new ‘‘civilisation’’ back to their home villages after
sufficient time spent in the city, thus raising the ‘‘quality’’ of the
villagers as well as themselves (Murphy, 2002). Proposals for
educating and training migrant workers reflect this conceptua-
lisation of rural migrants as ‘‘quality’’ vectors (in transferring low
quality to the city and, on their return, high quality to the
countryside). New plans issued by China’s State Council in
September 2003 proposed the training in basic skills of
approximately 10 million migrant workers, with half of them to
receive further professional training in addition. The aim of the
project was not only to create ‘‘high quality’’ workers but also to
provide training which would be of use to the home village on the
migrants’ return. By 2010, according to the plans, work and skills
training would have been provided for a total of 200 million
migrant workers (China Daily, 2003).
Raising the ‘‘quality’’ of the people is in large part an educational
project. In addition to adult education and training programmes
and the dissemination of educational information through
television, radio and newspapers, there has been an increased
focus on the education of China’s children. Since the late 1990s,
much educational reform and experimentation has taken place in
state schools in the name of ‘‘quality-oriented education’’ (suzhi
jiaoyu). Quality-oriented education is essentially the reverse of
exam-orientated education (yingshi jiaoyu), concernedwith the all-
round development of each student, and emphasising ability,
creativity, practical work and analysis. Morality teaching is also an
important component, as well as education for the promotion of
mental and physical health (Kipnis, 2006). The express purpose of
the new style of schooling is to ‘‘build up an education system
adapted to the needs of the market economy’’ and to ‘‘alter the
divorce between education and the economy and modernisation
drive’’ (Xie, 2002).
With this official emphasis on improving the ‘‘quality’’ of
migrants, and the focus of the Chinese state on fostering ‘‘quality’’
through education, one might reasonably expect a focus on the
education of migrant children. Instead, as Norma Diamond has
pointed out in an early work on suzhi, the government’s aims of
improving population quality ‘‘seem improbable’’, given the
‘‘absence of formal schooling for the hundreds of thousands of
children whose parents have joined the floating population
seeking work in the towns and cities’’ (Diamond, 1997). The
situation was no clearer in 2004: the obvious contradiction in the
state’s efforts to improve the ‘‘quality’’ of children and migrants
while failing to provide an education for the more than 300 000
migrant children in Beijing needs explanation.3.2. Possible reasons for exclusion: school space
One of the reasons commonly given by Chinese officials for the
lack of state education available formigrant children in the capital is
a lack of school places. Two Beijing officials I spoke to suggested that
thiswas themain reasonwhymigrant children couldnotbeenrolled
in state schools at a price which their parents could afford. School
places are already under pressure, and current funds are insufficient
for expanding state schools, Iwas told.All local childrenmustfirst be
allocated school places, leaving a very small quota for non-local
students. However, according to official statistics, birth rates in
China fell by 0.2% between 2000 and 2003 (Renmin Ribao, 2004). In
urbanareas, the ratemaybe fallingeven faster, leavingmanyschools
withexcess capacity (ChinaDevelopmentBrief, 2000).A2002 report
suggested that Beijing state schools had an official maximum
capacityof over1.5million students, but that thenumber enrolledat
that timewasonly1.2million (HumanRights inChina, 2002). Twoof
the six state schools I visited in 2004 had unused classrooms,
suggesting that enrolments had fallen, and teachers confirmed this.
None of the state primary schools where I observed classes
approached the maximum number of 50 students per class set by
the Beijing education authorities; the average number of students
per primary class was closer to 35. A lack of space for the migrant
children in city state schools therefore does not seemplausible as an
explanation for the failure of the Beijing authorities to provide
education for migrant children. While it is possible that the current
allocation of funds for education may be insufficient for expanding
schools aswell as financing other educational projects, it is not clear
why the education of several hundred thousandmigrant children in
Beijing alone shouldbe sucha lowpriority for government spending.
3.3. Possible reasons for exclusion: ‘‘quality’’ of migrant children and
families
It is interesting to note that arguments given for failing to
provide an education for migrant children are often framed in
terms of the children’s ‘‘quality’’. For example, instead of discussing
how the children’s ‘‘quality’’ could be improved through education,
urban officials and teachers are often concerned that accepting
such children will affect the overall ‘‘quality’’ of education in the
cities. Four state school teachers told me that migrant children are
‘‘difficult to teach’’, and two explained this in terms of the low
‘‘quality’’ of their parents. One state school principal told me that
migrant parents ‘‘do not pay attention to education’’ and thus
migrant children ‘‘do not develop proper habits. . .the parents’
quality is low and so the children’s quality is low’’. These attitudes
are common not only among teachers but also among officials.
District authorities thus prefer to spend their education funding on
improving ‘‘weak schools’’ and developing small supplementary
classes in order to upgrade the overall education quality, instead of
accepting large numbers of low ‘‘quality’’ migrant children (Duan
and Zhou, 1999).
A 1997 Chinese government report (sponsored by UNESCO) on
migrant children stated:
‘‘several factors contributed to the non-attendance at school by
part of the school-age children of migrants. . .first of all, the fees
charged were too high. . .second, the parents of children were
busy working and unable to pay attention to the schooling of
their children; third, the environment of these families was
unfavourable, the school performance of these childrenwas not
good and they were weary of studying.’’ (UNESCO, 2000).
While this does identify some of the key barriers to migrant
education, like other reports it places a large proportion of the
responsibility on themigrants themselves. Targetingmigrants’ low
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the problems faced by migrants in adapting to an unfamiliar
cultural environment and the many structural factors preventing
migrant children’s access to education in the cities.7
Furthermore, based onmy fieldwork, the image of most migrant
parents as lacking the time or ability to participate actively in their
children’s education is unjustified. It is a myth of the low ‘‘quality’’
individual, who is either selfish and unwilling to invest in the long-
termfutureofhis/her children,orwho, ineventhemost sympathetic
press reports, is shown as a mere passive victim of circumstances
rather than an agent capable of forming goals and participating
actively in their realisation. Such images, unrooted in reality, survive
and are employed by urban teachers, local authorities and even
central government officials: through repeated use, they become
self-perpetuating and are therefore influential even among those
sympathetic to rural migrants. Many reports in the Chinese press
showruralparents as reckless or selfish if theybring their children to
the cities, and even those concerned about the plight of migrant
children tend to depict them as the unfortunate victims of parents
too ignorant toappreciate the importanceof education (for example,
see Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 2003).
In fact, almost all of themigrant parents I encountered in Beijing
were concerned about the quality of their children’s education.
Migrant parents I encountered were not, as the Beijing media
depicted, unable or unwilling to become involved: they not only
suffered extra financial hardship in order to send their offspring to
school but also actively participated in the direction of their
children’s education through identifying suitable schools, nego-
tiating with teachers over the curriculum and, in some cases,
organising extra classes for infants or sending their children to
school early. This would seem to be ‘‘high quality’’ parenting. In
fact, 17 of the 32 migrant parents I interviewed believed their
children received a higher quality education in ‘‘black’’ city schools
than in their home village, suggesting that bringing their children
to the capital was not reckless or selfish but actually intended to
benefit the children. Many migrants spoke disparagingly of the
quality of rural education, and in particular of the recent reforms
which had provided a more vocational style of education in the
countryside. All of the parents I interviewedwere keen to give their
children the opportunity of finding off-farm employment, and so it
is unsurprising that they resisted the direction of their children’s
education towards farming. For many parents, then, bringing their
children to the city and enrolling them in migrant schools seemed
the bestway to provide their childrenwith a chance to pursue their
ideas of a good life. Seven of the 32 parents interviewed expressly
mentioned improving the education or prospects of their children
as the main factor influencing their own decision to migrate. The
state, however, takes no account of this kind of aspiration.
Migrants are encouraged to leave children in their home villages to
be educated while the parents work in the cities or to return home
themselves and ‘‘tend the land’’.
3.4. Possible reasons for exclusion: limiting migration
Not only the quality of the ruralmigrants but also their quantity
is seen as a problem in the city. A second major reason for the
continuing barriers to migrant children enrolling in city schools is
undoubtedly local authorities’ fears that relaxing controls will lead
to a massive influx of potentially permanent migrants (Zhang and
MacLeod, 2000). While previous studies have shown that many
migrants do retain extensive links to their home villages and plan7 This study, like most Chinese government studies on rural migrants, focused
solely on the small proportion of migrants registered as temporary residents in the
city. Therefore, no mention is made at all of the administrative barriers to state
school education faced by the large majority of migrants.to return there eventually, of the 32migrant parents I interviewed,
only 12 intended to return to their native places, and of these only
four planned to return within the next 5 years. Limiting
educational opportunities for migrant children can therefore be
seen as a conscious strategy used by the city authorities to increase
the costs of migration so as to deter migrants from settling
permanently in the cities. A proposal from the Beijing Branch of the
Democratic League (one of China’s eight advisory ‘‘democratic
parties’’) explained that although outsiders are ‘‘a necessity for the
modernisation of the city’’, the city has to ‘‘expend a certain
amount of social capital’’ in providing for them. Therefore,
‘‘both the government and city residents hope that they can get
the maximum benefit from the labour services provided by
outsiderswhile. . .minimising social capital expended. The basic
method is to increase the costs of migration, in order to control
the overall number of outsiders. Education is one of the efficient
tactics for increasing the cost of migration’’ (cited in Human
Rights in China, 2006, p. 8).
The large numbers of migrants are seen by urban residents and
officials to take up resources which more properly belong to city
people. The idea that migrants put pressure on Beijing’s transport
facilities, security, social welfare, water and the environment was
repeatedly expressed to me during fieldwork. Beijingers also felt
that increasing competition for jobs was the result of large-scale
migration. One official commented that ‘‘urban people feel
migrants are a threat to their comfortable situation. Actually, in
many places, they are right’’. However, it is interesting to note that
such attitudes were directed mainly at the children of poorer
migrants. In order to encourage investment in cities such as Beijing
and Shenzhen, local governments implemented policies to reduce
temporary schooling fees for the children of people who bringwith
them funds, management skills, technology, or other professional
skills to the cities, or to exempt such parents from the fees
altogether (thus discrediting the idea of inadequate educational
resources to support newcomers).8 Failure to provide education
can thus be seen as amajor strategy on the part of the authorities to
reduce the numbers of poor, ‘‘low quality’’ migrants settling in the
cities.
Official concerns that large numbers of poor migrants bring
disorder to China’s cities can be seen to mirror popular concerns in
developed countries about an influx of immigrants and the
perceived consequences in terms of crime, employment, pressure
on resources and general instability. Nor are concerns about
internal migrants among developing countries unique to China: a
wave of violent attacks in early 2008 in Mumbai targeted poor
migrant workers from north India and was actively supported by
local political parties such as the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena,
which blamed migrants for putting pressure on jobs and resources
as well as for ‘‘swamping’’ the Maharashtrian culture of the city.
However, in India the national government has condemned
localised attacks on migrants, does not seek to restrict internal
migration and supports local non-state initiatives to integrate
migrant children into the state school system or educate them in
alternative centres. In China the state not only takes an active role
in excluding migrants from state schooling, but also opposes
migrants’ own efforts to provide education for their children. That
state developmental policy should be based onwhat seem to be the
fears of a minority of urban dwellers about rural migrants, in
contradiction of its own rhetoric about population ‘‘quality’’ and
the importance of education, needs further explanation.8 See Solinger (1999), for an argument that even unskilled migrant labourers
expand employment opportunities, thus ruling out one potential explanation for
favouring wealthy migrants with funds to invest.
C. Goodburn / International Journal of Educational Development 29 (2009) 495–504 5033.5. Central versus local government
Is it possible that the exclusion of migrants from education is
merely a result of the misapplication of state policy by local
authorities, rather than a strategy for limiting migration by the
central government? Since the state’s decentralisation policies of
the 1980s, education has been under local jurisdiction. The central
government therefore does not dictate education policy to the local
authorities, but rather gives ‘‘policy recommendations’’. Since the
1998 ‘‘Provisional Measures for the Education of Migrant
Children’’, the central government has encouraged local autho-
rities to admit migrant children into state schools, to build new
state schools for migrant children and to support private schools
which meet minimum educational, health and safety standards.
However, these policy directions have given local government a
large amount of freedom in interpreting the state’s guidelines.
Depending on local conditions, municipal authorities could select
the most appropriate strategy, or choose to do nothing.
In Beijing, where there are more rural migrants than in many
other Chinese cities, the city’s municipal government has been
particularly unsympathetic to migrants. Contrary to the spirit of
the recommendations to allow migrant children into state schools
and to support private schools, the city authorities have allowed
state schools to charge uncapped extra fees and have focused on
enforcing the closure of private schools which do not meet
minimum standards. However, the effects of decentralisation are
visible even at the lowest levels of the state hierarchy in Beijing:
the city’s 10 district governments have chosen to implement the
state’s directive on migrant education in different ways. As
discussed in Section 2.8, Fengtai district has taken a particularly
firm stance against unlicensed schools while, at least since 2001,
failing to provide state school education for the children affected
by school closures. By contrast, Xuanwumen district and
Shijingshan district had each, by 2002, set aside two state-funded
schools solely for migrant children. In the Shijingshan school,
migrant families had to pay the temporary schooling fee, but they
were exempted from other fees (Beijing Ribao, 2000). Although
high fees in comparison with migrant schools and stringent
regulations regarding the documents necessary for admission
meant that enrolment was low, these schools did offer a more
affordable state education to migrants.
Yet these are the exceptions rather than the norm in Beijing.
Furthermore, this situation is not only the responsibility of the city
and district governments, since the central government has failed
to provide additional resources to those districts with large
migrant populations to cope with the extra costs of migrant
children’s schooling. State funds for education are allocated to
district authorities on the basis of number of registered residents,
and some districts, such as Fengtai, struggle to provide adequate
educational facilities for their own residents let alone the large
number of migrant settlers. Furthermore, the state’s 1998
‘‘Provisional Measures for the Education of Migrant Children’’
allow that local school authorities need only consider school
applications from migrants once all local children have obtained
their places and do not bar state schools from administering an
entrance test (which many migrant children fail because of
differing standards of rural education and unfamiliarity with the
different urban curriculum). They do not prevent local authorities
from closing unlicensedmigrant schools arbitrarily, without notice
and with no attempt to ensure continuity of education for the
children affected. Finally, despite the long ‘‘trial period’’ of the
‘‘Provisional Measures for the Education of Migrant Children’’, the
central authorities have still not in 2008 passed any permanent law
which would hold local governments responsible for the schooling
of all children, regardless of hukou status. All these factors suggest
that the responsibility for the lack of education for migrantchildren lies not only with local authorities, but also with the
central government which has been reluctant to take action to
improve the situation.
3.6. Migrant communities, schools and the state
While it is possible, as I have said, that some local governments
do not have the resources necessary to provide state education for
all of themigrant children in their jurisdiction, the state’s failure to
provide extra funding implies that a very low priority is given to
the task of educating migrant children. As noted above, this failure
to fundmigrant education seems strongly at odds with the Chinese
government’s commitment to improving migrants’ ‘‘quality’’, and
provides a sharp contrast with other developing countries where
insufficient funds are available for state provision of important
goods. In many other countries, authorities are willing to allow
NGOs and/or the private market to deliver these goods; indeed,
sometimes such solutions are supported by the state through
financial aid, tax incentives and other measures. As I have said in
Section 1.3, this seems to be the case in other developing countries
such as India and Bangladesh. In China, however, not only does the
state not provide education for migrants, but it also takes strong
action against the privatemarket inmigrant schools. This response
seems particularly puzzling in light of the Chinese government’s
strong support for individual entrepreneurship since the 1990s. An
analysis of the state’s opposition to private migrant schools may
shed further light on the situation.
Although the official reasons for closing down migrant schools
are usually reported as health and safety problems, lack of
planning permission for purpose-built structures or the requisi-
tioning of the land for other projects, none of these reasons stand
up to scrutiny. For instance, although some migrant schools are in
very poor physical condition, even the better ones are vulnerable to
closure on health and safety grounds since the municipal
government in Beijing sets a minimum standard which even
many state schools cannot satisfy, including various kinds of sports
facilities and a campus of at least 15 000 m2 (Hu and Li, 2006). Julia
Kwong has suggested that the government’s opposition to the
private schools set up by migrant communities arises from a
tension between the state and the emerging civil society in China.
According to this argument, the authorities resent popular support
for migrant schools, seeing such schools as an encroachment on
their monopoly on the provision of education (Kwong, 2004).
While this interpretation downplays the importance and accep-
tance of existing licensed private schools in the Chinese education
system (typically attended by the children of wealthy non-
migrants), it does raise interesting questions about the relations
between the state and the migrant communities in China.
Kwong is right to suggest that the authorities’ antipathy to
migrant schooling might be a response to challenges to the
legitimacy of the state system. However, the state’s actions may be
more than a response to fears over the opinions of an emerging
civil society. Poor migrant communities are often seen as existing
‘‘outside’’ the law in China, sincemostmigrants are unregistered to
live and work in the cities and their existence there is thus
technically illegal. In the Chinese press, there has been a focus on
criminal and social problems created by migrant communities.
While this is not, of course, an unusual reaction tomigrants in both
the developing and developed world, in China the press is strictly
controlled by the party-state and therefore its views may be seen
as a reflection of the central authorities’ own attitudes. The
Communist Party in China effectively defines itself as the driving
force behind China’s development, despite its large-scale retreat
from welfare provision from the early 1990s until the time of my
fieldwork (as exemplified by declining state funding for health and
education, especially in rural areas, during this period). The
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therefore be seen as a threat to state and Party legitimacy, and this
threat may be particularly potent in the case of rural–urban
migrants.
When migrant communities come together to provide such
basic goods as schooling, their actions may seem less like acts of
entrepreneurship within the state framework, and more like
attempts to create an alternative system altogether. Owing to the
sheer numbers of migrants and their existence broadly outside the
state system (very few migrants have state social insurance, use
state healthcare or participate in state organisations; many do not
follow state family planning regulations and have unregistered
‘‘black’’ children; and, because of their mobility, few are effectively
monitored by local state networks), migrants represent a sizeable
group existing, to some extent, beyond the reach of the state. The
state’s response to ‘‘black’’ schools may, then, reflect a more
general fear of the potential challenge to state legitimacy posed by
the vast numbers of migrants in the city, rather than a more
general antipathy to non-state provision of goods. A fuller analysis
of the state’s failure to provide education for migrant children
would have to take into account the far broader question of how
the state perceives the migrant community. I cannot investigate
this large issue in this paper. Rather, I raise these issues to suggest
that the state’s failure to provide migrant education cannot be
understood solely as a result of lack of resources or unclear
jurisdiction, but should be seen in the broader context of the
challenge migrant communities pose (or are perceived as posing)
to the state more generally.
4. Conclusions
In this paper I have described the serious restrictions imposed
on migrant children seeking an education, whether through state
or private means, in Beijing in 2004–2005. I have argued that the
problems faced by these children are symptomatic of the status of
unregistered rural migrants in Chinese urban society. The Chinese
state places great emphasis on the importance of education for
economic development, and many commentators have argued for
a strong relationship between the expansion of education since
1949 and China’s rapid development during the last three decades.
However, the state’s policies towards rural migrant children seem
to deny basic opportunities for education to a significant portion of
the population. It is difficult to predict precisely what the results of
these exclusionary policies will be. However, it seems reasonable
to suppose that if these problems are not addressed they will have
a serious impact on China’s future development. Not only will a
large section of the population not have the skills necessary for
China’s further economic development, but they will also lack the
kind of education needed to develop the capabilities for leading
decent, happy and successful lives.
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